Indian nuclear capability is out of whack with the threat scenario

India's nuclear doctrine is centered on maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. However, there is serious doubt that our current nuclear deterrent is credible. Indeed, our nuclear capability seems to be completely out of whack with the threat that we face.
The threat that we face today, both from China and Pakistan, is not of annihilation, but humiliation through loss of territory. Our territorial integrity is at stake, not our existence.
In this and the following series of posts on the subject, I will present to you credible threat scenarios and illustrate how our proven nuclear capability will not help us deal with these scenarios.
In this post I will dwell on a realistic threat scenario emanating from China.
The Chinese Threat
India is an impediment to Chinese ambitions of dominating Asia, and eventually emerging as an economic and military superpower at par with the US.
In recent history China has twice used its military might against sovereign nations (India and Vietnam) to humiliate them. It is an astute strategy, a strategy that has worked, a strategy that can continue to work in a nuclear world.
Chinese humiliation of India in 1962 still dictates our policy towards that nation, with fear guiding the conduct of policy towards them as much as logic. Indian military and bureaucracy remains extremely wary of the Chinese over 45 years after the slap on the face they delivered in 1962.
Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh being presented a traditional memento by the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Shri Dorjee Khandu, at a public meeting, in Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh on January 31, 2008. Photo Credit: PIB
Indian regional aspirations will surely place India at odds with China in the future. It is just a matter of time. When a major conflict of interest develops, if India does not give in, China will be tempted to deliver India a reality check through a measured military blow.
It could, for example, put India's economic progress back a decade, and put our great power ambitions on hold for the next half a century, through a massive intrusion into Arunachal Pradesh.
How the threat could play out
China has been steadily building up its infrastructure in Tibet, to a level where it could mobilize enough troops to overrun Indian border posts within a matter of weeks.
India's counter mobilization, to stop the planned Chinese incursion, could take months because of the relatively poor infrastructure, giving the Chinese a window of opportunity to overrun vast chunks of Arunachal Pradesh.
In such a scenario, India's only hope will be a strike on intruding Chinese troops with tactical nuclear weapons, while they are still massed on the right side of the border.
The threat and ability to deliver such a strike would in all probabilities stop the Chinese in their tracks. If it does not, the strike would definitely do so.
However, if we are forced to go through with a nuclear strike, a Chinese nuclear counter force response would definitely follow.
Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh meeting with Army Jawans/Officers during the 'Badakhana' at forward area at Lohitpur, in Arunachal Pradesh on February 01, 2008. Photo Credit: PIB
The nature of the Chinese response would be determined by the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. A weak deterrent would tempt the Chinese to make their counter strike massive, enabling them to achieve their original goal of humiliating India.
The existence of a strong Indian deterrent would limit them to a more face saving response. At worst, it would be a punishing strike, but not a humiliating one. There is no humiliation in standing up to a bully even if you end up receiving more than you gave.
The imperative for a 'credible' nuclear deterrent
A credible deterrent, and a sensible nuclear doctrine that does not rule out first use of nuclear weapons, will ensure that China removes India from its list of nations that it can humiliate, and force it to deal with India much like it deals with Russia and Japan, two other neighboring countries with which it has territorial disputes.
It is clear that to counter a very realistic Chinese threat, India needs tactical nuclear weapons mounted on accurate delivery systems, and a proven counter force (nuclear) and counter value (Thermonuclear) capability, both of which we don't have.
Since our deterrent is less than credible at this point of time, our best bet would be to speed up the development of our infrastructure in the northeast, to ensure that we can match a build up of conventional Chinese forces, both in time and numbers, to dissuade any incursions.